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Use of Supervisory Power to Order Counsel for
Indigent Paternity Defendants: Hepfel v. Bashaw
Lorna Lee Hepfel and her child who was born out of wed-
lock were receiving AFDC1 benefits from Houston County.
With the County Attorney acting as her legal representative,2
Hepfel brought an action in state district court to have Steven
Bashaw adjudicated the father of her child. Bashaw denied pa-
ternity and moved the court to appoint counsel for him on the
ground that he was indigent. The motion was denied, but in a
mandamus proceeding the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered
counsel appointed.3 At a rehearing requested by the County
Attorney, the court sitting en banc affirmed its earlier decision,
holding that as an exercise of its supervisory power a court
may order that counsel be appointed for indigent paternity de-
fendants when the state has already supplied counsel for the
plaintiff. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979).
The disingenuous manner in which paternity adjudications
have traditionally been conducted has long been an embarrass-
ment to the legal community.4 In 1969, a commission investi-
gating paternity law and practice was led to "the inescapable
conclusion that coercion, corruption, pejury and indifference
to the rights of the individual defendant pervade in the day to
day practice in this area of judicial proceedings." 5 Moreover, a
1963 study indicated that although determinations of paternity
are often based on nothing more than the accusation of the
mother, 39.6% of the accused fathers in a sample group could
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
2. Section 257.254 of Minnesota Statutes provides in part: "When re-
quested to do so by a . . public welfare or other social service agency, the
county attorney may appear on behalf of and represent the complainant in [ac-
tions for the determination of paternity] and shall obtain and present such evi-
dence as may be necessary." mnn. STAT. § 257.254 (1978).
3. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1976) (per curiam), affid on re-
hearing, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979).
4. Paternity adjudications have been characterized as "the widest area of
legal 'shakedown' that is known to exist." Schatkin, Should Paternity Cases be
Tried in a Civil or Criminal Court?, 1 Cme. L. REv. 18, 24 (1954), quoted in H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGrrmACY: LAw AND SocIAL PoLcy 106-07 (1971). See generally
Schatkin, The Problem of Defense in a Paternity Proceeding, 21 DE PAUL I. REV.
85 (1972). See also Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. 1979).
5. STATE OF ILL. FAM. STUDY COnMM'N, REPORT AND RECOIeMENDATIONS 55
(1969), quoted in H. KRAUSE, supra note 4, at 107.
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not have been the father of the child in question.6 In recent
years, the problems arising from the unfairness of paternity
hearings have been exacerbated by a dramatic increase in the
number of paternity suits being brought.7 Although this result
is due in part to a corresponding increase in the rate of illegiti-
mate births,8 the primary force behind the growing number of
paternity suits is the involvement of county attorneys in bring-
ing suits on behalf of mothers who are receiving AFDC bene-
fits.9 County attorneys have become increasingly involved in
paternity adjudications, in part as a result of a 1975 amendment
to the Social Security Act' 0 permitting federal grants to be
withheld from any state that fails to implement a plan requir-
ing recipients of public aid (1) to assign to the state any right
to support they may have from other persons, and (2) to coop-
erate with the state in establishing the paternity of any of their
children born out of wedlock.'
6. See Sussman, Blood Grouping Tests-A Review of 1000 Cases of Dis-
puted Paternity, 40 AM. J. CLniCAL PATHOLOGY 38 (1963), quoted in H. KRAUSE,
supra note 4, at 107-08.
7. For example, in the last seven years the Ramsey County Attorney has
filed the following number of paternity actions in the Family Division of Minne-
sota District Court for the Second District (Ramsey County):
Year Cases Filed
1973 126
1974 194
1975 288
1976 498
1977 802
1978 748
1979 (through Nov. 8) 521
Telephone interview with Pat Kenny, Clerk of Court, Minnesota Second Dis-
trict Court, Family Division, St. Paul, Minnesota (Nov. 13, 1979).
8. The percentage of illegitimate births as a function of all births has
more than doubled since 1965.
Date Percent illegitimate births
1965 7.7
1970 10.7
1972 12.4
1973 13.0
1974 13.2
1975 14.2
1976 14.8
1977 15.5
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 66 (1979).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 6305(c) (5) (C), 88 Stat. 2337
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (27) (1970)).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (26), 604(a) (2) (1976). Moreover, the plan must pro-
vide that the state will in fact undertake to establish paternity in such cases.
See id. § 654(4).
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An aspect of paternity adjudications often labelled unfair is
the states' practice of representing indigent plaintiffs without
making any similar provision for appointing counsel for indi-
gent defendants. Since 1976, the highest courts of five states
have considered the issue of whether indigent defendants in
paternity suits have a constitutional right to counsel, and three
of them-Alaska, California, and Michigan-have recognized
the right.12 Each of these courts based its decision on the due
process clause of its state constitution, holding that the provi-
sion of counsel is required because the possibility of incarcera-
tion for failure to support the child threatens a liberty interest
of the father;13 the California court's holding was based on the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution as well.14 Both the California and Alaska courts
also reasoned that the paternity defendant's interest in avoid-
ing the wrongful imposition of a parent-child relationship is as
compelling as a parent's interest in maintaining the parent-
child relationship, an interest that has been deemed important
enough to mandate the provision of counsel in child neglect
and dependency hearings.1 5 In addition, the California and
12. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1977); Salas v. Cortez, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979); Ar-
tibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976).
13. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Alaska 1977); Salas v. Cor-
tez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 26-27, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533-34, cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 209 (1979); Artibee v. Cheyboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 56-57,
243 N.W.2d 248, 249-50 (1976).
14. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 26-27, 593 P.2d 226, 229, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529,
532, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979).
15. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 801 (Alaska 1977); Salas v. Cortez,
154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, 593 P.2d 226, 230, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979). The
fundamental nature of the right of parents to raise children was recognized
more than fifty years ago. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("lib-
erty" in due process clause "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right... to marry, establish a home and bring up children"). In
declaring unconstitutional an Illinois statute that presumed the father of an il-
legitimate child unfit for custody and denied him a hearing before placing his
children up for adoption, the Supreme Court stated: 'The rights to conceive
and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential basic civil rights of
man.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citation omitted). See also
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (right of blood rela-
tives to live together in same home); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973)
(right of woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (right to use contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry person of another race); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right of parents to send their children to private
schools). Extending this line of reasoning, several state courts have held that
there is a constitutional right to counsel in child dependency and neglect hear-
ings. For a listing of authorities, see Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 263 n.13
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Alaska courts agreed that a constitutional right to counsel must
exist because of the complexity of the issues involved in pater-
nity suits and the relative powerlessness of unrepresented de-
fendants who face, in effect, prosecution by the state.16 The
two state courts that have refused to recognize the right of indi-
gent paternity defendants to counsel-New York and Washing-
ton' 7-- emphasized the civil nature of paternity hearings and
reasoned that the threatened loss of liberty18 that these hear-
ings present is too remote to mandate a constitutional right to
counsel.' 9
In Hepfel v. Bashaw, the Minnesota Supreme Court termed
"dubious" the claim that indigent defendants in paternity suits
have a constitutional right to counsel.2 0 The court did recog-
(SD. Fla. 1977). Minnesota has recognized the importance of the family rela-
tionship, although not on constitutional grounds. See McDonald v. Copperud,
295 Minn. 440, 444, 206 N.W.2d 551, 553 (1973).
16. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Alaska 1977); Salas v. Cor-
tez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 30-31, 593 P.2d 226, 231-32, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 534-35, cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979).
17. See Miller v. Gordon, 58 A.D.2d 1027, 1028, 397 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1977)
(mem.); State v. Walker, 87 Wash. 2d 443, 446, 553 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1976).
18. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has made clear that when
life and liberty are at stake, due process requires the right to counsel. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (right to counsel for any offense
including petty misdemeanors if imprisonment follows conviction); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (right to counsel in juvenile commitment proceedings);
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607-10 (1967) (right to counsel at psychiatric
determination that might lead to commitment for indeterminate length of
time); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (right to counsel for de-
fendants charged with felony); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932)
(right to counsel for defendant charged with murder). Reacting to this gradual
expansion of the due process right to counsel, many commentators have ex-
pressed the belief that the Court is moving toward a general requirement that
counsel be provided for indigents in civil cases as well. See, e.g., Botein, Ap-
pointed Counselfor the Indigent Civil Defendant: A Constitutional Right With-
out a Judicial Remedy?, 36 BROoKLYN L. REV. 368 (1970); Note, The Indigent's
"Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FoRnm M L REV. 989 (1975); Note, Indi-
gent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); Comment, The
Continuing Expansion of the Right to Counsel, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. 473 (1969).
See also Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforce-
able Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants
Part One: The Legal Arguments, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 249 (1978). In the most
recent decision of this series, however, the Court stated that Argersinger delim-
its the due process right to counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373
(1979).
19. See Miller v. Gordon, 58 A.D.2d 1027, 1028, 397 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1977)
(mem.); State v. Walker, 87 Wash. 2d 443, 446, 553 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1976). In New
York, the right to court-appointed counsel was extended by statute to defend-
ants in paternity adjudications through a 1978 amendment to the Family Court
Act. See 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 456, § 5 (codified at N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 262(a) (viii)
(McKinney Supp. 1976-1979)).
20. 279 N.W.2d at 344.
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nize, however, that several important interests of a putative fa-
ther are at stake in a paternity hearing: remaining free from
financial obligations, from incarceration, and from injury to rep-
utation.2 1 The court also noted that the illegitimate child has a
substantial interest in an accurate determination.2 2 Because
paternity hearings threaten these important though not consti-
tutionally protected interests, 23 the Hepfel court based its rul-
ing that the state must provide counsel for indigent defendants
on the court's "supervisory power to ensure the fair administra-
tion of justice."24
According to the court, the best way to protect the interests
threatened by paternity actions is to ensure that determina-
tions of paternity are accurate. 25 The court observed, however,
that "in the trial of a contested paternity action, appallingly lit-
tle attention is given to the accuracy of the determination,"26
and that the predominant interest represented by the county
attorney is that of the welfare board in escaping AFDC pay-
ments.27 Thus, from the county attorney's standpoint, any ad-
judication of paternity, whether accurate or not, is in the state's
financial interest. The Hepfel court therefore concluded that
ordering the provision of counsel was necessary to enhance the
accuracy of paternity proceedings.28
Although the court in Hepfel did not articulate its reasons
for rejecting Bashaw's constitutional claim to counsel, its deci-
sion appears correct. It is true that an adjudication of paternity
will have a significant adverse financial impact on the defend-
ant: he must provide financial support for the child until it
21. Id. at 345.
22. Id. at 346-47.
23. See text accompanying notes 29-50, 64 infra.
24. 279 N.W.2d at 348.
25. Id. at 347-48.
26. Id. at 345. The court observed that determinations of paternity are
often made upon the mere accusation of the mother without corroborating evi-
dence. Id. It also cited a study, based on blood tests, which revealed that in a
group of 1000 cases of disputed paternity, 39.6 percent of the accused fathers
could not possibly have been the fathers of the children in question, and that 18
percent of the group of men who had voluntarily admitted paternity were not in
fact the fathers of the children in question. Id. (citing Sussman, supra note 6,
at 38).
27. [P]resently the welfare department, not the child or the mother,
can potentially become the aggressive and predominant party in inter-
est, emphasizing primarily its concern to find the man it can legally
hold financially liable to reimburse it for the support expenses it incurs
and, without the aid of blood tests, accepting, as current law allows, the
uncorroborated testimony of the mother as sufficient proof of paternity.
279 N.W.2d at 346.
28. Id. at 348.
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reaches majority, and his estate, his insurance, even his work-
men's compensation benefits can be burdened by the child.
2 9
These interests, however, are property interests, and they
neither distinguish paternity suits from most other civil pro-
ceedings nor do they provide an adequate basis for a constitu-
tional right to counsel.3 0 Compelling the state to provide
counsel to indigent defendants whose financial interests are
threatened by civil paternity actions logically should lead to the
provision of counsel for indigent defendants in virtually all
types of civil actions where substantial financial interests are at
stake. But courts have been unwilling to so extend the right to
counsel.3 1
An adjudication of paternity may also indirectly threaten
the father's liberty interest: he can be imprisoned for criminal
nonsupport if without excuse he knowingly fails to support any
of his children under the age of sixteen,32 or for civil contempt
if after the paternity finding the court demands a bond or other
security for the payment of support and the father refuses to
give it.33 The possibility of prosecution for civil contempt for
nonpayment of support continues until the child reaches the
age of majority.3 4 An adjudged father would have a right to
29. Id. at 345 (citing Unborn Child v. Evans, 310 Minn. 197, 245 N.W.2d 600
(1976); MNN. STAT. § 525.172 (1978)).
30. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLuM. L. REV.
1322 (1966); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J.
545 (1967); note 18 supra. See also Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966).
31. See note 18 supra; Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966).
32. Section 609.375 of Minnesota Statutes provides that one who knowingly
fails to support his minor child without a lawful excuse may be fined, impris-
oned, or both. "As used in section 609.375, 'child' means a child under the age
of 16 years who is in necessitous circumstances and includes such child born
out of wedlock whose paternity has been duly established." MINN. STAT.
§ 609.37 (1978). If the nonsupport lasts for ninety days or less the crime is a
misdemeanor; if it lasts for longer than ninety days the crime is a felony with a
maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. See id. § 609.375.
33. The court may require an adjudicated father to give a bond or other se-
curity for the payment of the support judgment immediately following a finding
of paternity. MIN. STAT. § 257.263 (1978). If the father refuses to pay at that
time, the court may find him in contempt. Id. § 257.262:
34. Section 588.02 of Minnesota Statutes provides:
Every court of justice and every judicial officer may punish a contempt
by fine or imprisonment, or both; and in addition thereto, when the
contempt involves the wilfull disobedience of an order of the court re-
quiring the payment of money for the support of maintenance of a mi-
nor child, the court may require the payment of the costs and a
reasonable attorney's fee, incurred in the prosecution of such con-
tempt, to be paid by the guilty party ....
Mnm. STAT. § 588.02 (1978).
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counsel at a trial for criminal nonsupport, 5 but the utility of
that right is diminished by the fact that he was not represented
by counsel at the earlier paternity hearing.3 6 Admissions made
at that hearing without the advice of counsel might preclude
the adjudged father's most effective defense in a subsequent
criminal nonsupport hearing. Thus, the civil determination of
paternity is arguably a "critical stage" in the criminal nonsup-
port proceeding that necessitates. the provision of counsel.37
Moreover, an adjudged father would be in contempt of court if
he refused to deposit the security for support that a court may
demand immediately following a finding of paternity, and the
prior finding of paternity would be res judicata at any subse-
quent contempt hearing.38 Thus, even if counsel were provided
35. See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) (coun-
sel must be provided in any case, whether it be a misdemeanor or felony prose-
cution, when conviction can result in incarceration). See also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963);
note 18 supra.
36. See Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Alaska 1977); Salas v.
Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28-29, 593 P.2d 226, 230-32, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533-35, cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979); Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54,
58, 243 N.W.2d 248, 250 (1976).
37. In criminal proceedings, the right to counsel begins when there exists a
possibility that the defendant could become prejudiced in the defense of his
case. More specifically, a critical stage in a criminal proceeding can be one in
which the defendant's rights might be lost, his defenses waived, or any other
stage at which the outcome of his case might be substantially affected. See,
e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (designating time of sentencing a
critical stage); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967) (designating
lineup after formal charges a critical stage); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
53 (1961) (designating arraignment a critical stage).
It is unclear under what circumstances a civil proceeding might be consid-
ered a critical stage in criminal proceedings. One court has held that a juvenile
has a right to counsel at a civil hearing to determine whether he should be
transferred from juvenile court to district court for prosecution as an adult,
since the transfer hearing is a "critical stage of proceedings 'criminal in nature,'
... at which time the 'defense' of juvenile status may be lost." In re Lewis, 88
Wash. 2d 556, 561, 564 P.2d 328, 331 (1977) (citation omitted). See also Prideaux
v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 411, 247 N.W.2d 385, 389-91 (1976)
(dictum) (the decision whether to take or refuse chemical testing is arguably a
"critical stage" in criminal proceeding for driving under the influence). It
should be noted that in Lewis and Prideaux the defendants had already been
charged with a crime at the time of the civil proceeding; the same result might
not occur if the civil proceeding took place prior to the initiation of the criminal
proceeding. See State v. Durnell, 16 Wash. App. 500, 502, 558 P.2d 252, 254 (1976)
(court was "unaware of any case which places the critical stage of a criminal
proceeding at a point before the criminal proceedings actually begin-indeed,
before the crime is even committed") (emphasis in original).
38. Although this issue has not yet been decided in Minnesota, it has in
other jurisdictions. See Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 802 (Alaska 1977);
Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533, cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979); Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54,
57-58, 243 N.W.2d 248, 250 (1976).
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SUPER VISOR Y POWER
at the contempt hearing,39 the father would be unable to raise
the defense of nonpaternity.
These indirect threats to liberty, however, do not seem suf-
ficient to support a fourteenth amendment due process right to
counsel, and Minnesota courts read the state constitution's due
process clause no more broadly than federal courts interpret
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.40 In Scott v.
IllinoiS,4 1 the United States Supreme Court held that due proc-
ess does not require the state to provide counsel when a de-
fendant "is charged with a statutory offense for which
imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually
imposed."4 2 Since there is no statutory authorization for im-
prisonment upon an adjudication of paternity, the rationale of
Scott would appear a fortiori to rule out any right to counsel in
paternity proceedings.43 In addition, it seems unlikely that an
adjudication of paternity would be deemed the "critical stage"
39. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that "due process
requires that the right of an indigent to appointed counsel 'must be extended to
a contempt proceeding, be it civil or criminal, where the defendant is faced
with the prospect of imprisonment."' United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154,
1155-56 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1975)).
For similar rulings, see In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468
F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972). Several state courts have also found a due proc-
ess right to counsel at civil contempt hearings when there is a possibility of in-
carceration. See Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Alaska 1974); Brown v.
Hendrick, 220 Pa. Super. 225, 227-29, 283 A.2d 722, 723-24 (1971); Tetro v. Tetro, 86
Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975). But see Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich.
367, 383, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976); Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 426-27, 322 A.2d 1,
2-3 (1974). The issue whether an indigent defendant has a right to counsel at a
civil contempt hearing has not yet been decided in Minnesota.
40. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated in dictum that it has the
power to extend the protection of the state's due process clause beyond that
required by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. See State v.
Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 522-23 (1961). However, no Minnesota
case has applied the state constitution's clause so as to reach a result different
from that which would have been reached under the fourteenth amendment
equivalent. See Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538
(1948); State v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 213 Minn. 395, 7 N.W.2d 691, aJl'd, 322
U.S. 292 (1942); In re Taylor, 175 Minn. 310, 219 N.W. 153 (1928).
41. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
42. Id. at 369. The Court noted that "actual imprisonment is a penalty dif-
ferent in kind from ... the mere threat of imprisonment [and that] actual im-
prisonment [is] the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel." Id. at 373.
43. Because it was clear that imprisonment would not be imposed in Scott,
the case can be distinguished from the somewhat less indirect threat of impris-
onment posed by criminal nonsupport proceedings, which might take place
subsequent to an adjudication of paternity. This distinction, however, ignores
the underlying antipathy of the Scott Court toward extending the constitu-
tional right to counsel beyond its current boundaries. See id. at 370.
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of a prosecution for criminal nonsupport, since in Kirby v. Illi-
nois44 the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel at-
taches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings.45 Finally, there is nothing about the
prospect of incarceration for civil contempt in paternity pro-
ceedings that distinguishes it from the prospect of incarcera-
tion for civil contempt in any other adjudicative setting. Since
the Minnesota court has eschewed the notion that the state
must provide indigent defendants with counsel in any civil ac-
tion that may eventually culminate in the defendant's impris-
onment for contempt,46 it seems clear that the deprivation of
liberty that might result if an adjudged father refused to pay
court-ordered child support is too remote from the paternity
adjudication to require the provision of counsel at the adjudica-
tive stage.47
The Hepfel court also recognized fhat some form of social
stigma or injury to reputation may result from an adjudication
of paternity.48 Nonetheless, it is well settled that the imposi-
tion of social stigma is not per se a sufficient deprivation of lib-
erty to warrant due process protection.49 Therefore, its
imposition should not constitute sufficient grounds for deriving
a constitutional right to counsel. This point is demonstrated by
the fact that no constitutional right to counsel inheres in adju-
dications of gross negligence, libel, or slander, or those result-
ing in punitive damages,5 0 even though those determinations
44. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Kirby involved a pre-charge lineup identification.
45. Id. at 689-90. The highest courts of several states have rejected Kirby
and have instead relied on their state constitutions to find a right to counsel at
pre-charge lineup identifications. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 641
(Alaska 1977); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 337-38, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28
(1974).
46. The Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of im-
prisonment for civil contempt in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Froelich, 196 Minn. 81, 264 N.W. 232 (1936) (failure to remove wall that en-
croached on neighbor's property); State v. Wiebke, 154 Minn. 61, 191 N.W. 249
(1923) (nonpayment of support following adjudication of paternity); Campbell
v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 186 N.W. 787 (1922) (failure to
obey an injunction). A court may resort to imprisonment for civil contempt
only when a defendant is able to obey but refuses to do so. See State v. Strong,
192 Minn. 420, 256 N.W. 900 (1934).
47. See, e.g., State v. Durnell, 16 Wash. App. 500, 501, 558 P.2d 252, 254 (1976)
(driver's license revocation hearing too remote from subsequent convictions to
be a "critical stage"). See also note 37 supra.
48. 279 N.W.2d at 345.
49. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (reputation alone is not an
interest protected by the due process clause).
50. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether
the procedural safeguards afforded defendants in civil actions in which punitive
damages are awarded should be the same as those afforded defendants in crim-
[Vol. 64.848
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carry some social stigma.
The court, in failing to find the existence of a constitutional
right to counsel in paternity actions, did not consider the puta-
tive father's interest in freedom from the imposition of the par-
ent-child relationship. Some courts regard this interest as a
fundamental liberty,5 ' since it involves the same basic issues as
the preservation of a family relationship-an interest long rec-
ognized as fundamental. 52 But while this right to have and
raise one's offspring is undoubtedly a fundamental liberty, it is
not clear that freedom from the imposition of a parent-child re-
lationship should be accorded this specially protected status.
When a court establishes a parent-child relationship by finding
paternity and ordering support, it has merely imposed a
financial obligation on the adjudged father. To equate this im-
position of financial obligation with the deprivation of care and
custody of a child distorts the nature of the family-related in-
terest that courts have found protected by the Constitution.5 3
It is doubtful that the right to remain free from this type of
financial burden could ever serve as the basis for a constitu-
tional right to counsel.
The court in Hepfel may have been reluctant to find a con-
stitutional right to counsel in civil paternity actions out of fear
that such a right would logically be extended to other civil ac-
tions in which financial, liberty, or family interests are at
stake.5 Such reluctance may serve to explain the court's use
inal prosecutions, see Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A
Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. I. REV. 1158, 1180-81 (1966).
51. Fundamental liberties are those that receive an extraordinarily high
degree of judicial solicitude. These liberties are usually explicit or implicit in
the Bill of Rights, but some-such as the right to privacy that characterizes
many family decisions-are "penumbral" to it. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (plurality). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-
54 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
52. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of the nature of the family relationship interest pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, see note 15 supra.
54. Courts generally have been unwilling to extend the right to counsel to
indigents involved in civil cases because of the great financial cost it would en-
tail. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
generally sources cited in note 18 supra.
In Minnesota, however, the extension of counsel to indigent paternity de-
fendants has not yet proven to be a significant economic burden. The Henne-
pin County Public Defender's Office has been defending indigent paternity
defendants since 1976, yet no new staff members have been needed. In 1978, of
the 725 paternity cases filed in Hennepin County, only 38 were referred to the
public defender's office because the defendant was indigent. Telephone inter-
view with Mike Richardson, Assistant County Attorney in charge of paternity,
Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 8, 1979). In Ramsey County, about two-thirds of the
783 paternity suits filed for the fiscal year 1978-1979 were against indigent de-
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of its supervisory power to create a "right" with such obvious
due process overtones.
The supervisory power of courts is often invoked to provide
greater procedural protection than does the Constitution.55
Traditionally, courts have asserted their supervisory power for
two purposes: to correct a particular injustice in an isolated
case 56 and to establish a general standard of procedural fair-
ness for situations in which constitutional safeguards have
proved inadequate.57 Hepfel is an example of the latter case.
Implicit in the court's creation of a general standard requiring
counsel for indigent defendants in paternity suits brought by
county attorneys is the perception of the injury that such pro-
ceedings inflict on "the law as an institution, the community at
large, and the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts." 58
Undoubtedly the primary factor behind the Hepfel court's
decision to invoke its supervisory powers was the cumulative
effect of the damage that paternity hearings inflict upon the
various interests of the putative father, even though none of
fendants. Under procedures in Ramsey County, defendants who contest the ac-
cusation of paternity are given blood tests. If the test does not exclude a
particular defendant, he is referred to the public defender. But see note 69 in-
fra. While the Ramsey County Board did appropriate $70,000 for blood testing,
there has been no need to increase the size of the Ramsey County Public De-
fender's staff to represent indigent defendants. Telephone interview with
Harry Peak, Assistant County Attorney for Ramsey County, St. Paul, Minn.
(Nov. 8, 1979).
55. See, e.g., City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979)
(mandating jury trial in criminal obscenity cases); City of St. Paul v. Whidby,
295 Minn. 129, 144, 203 N.W.2d 823, 831-32 (1972) (mandating criminal standard of
proof in certain ordinance violation cases); State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154
N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) (mandating appointment of counsel in misdemeanor
cases threatening defendant with incarceration); Peterson v. Peterson, 278
Minn. 275, 281, 153 N.W.2d 825, 830 (1967) (mandating jury trial in constructive
criminal contempt cases). The supervisory power has been used extensively
by federal courts and the courts of other states. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Campana, 414 U.S. 808, 812 (1973); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See generally Hill, The Bill of
Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 181 (1969); Note, The
Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050 (1965);
Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L REV. 1656
(1963).
56. See, e.g., Saldana v. United States, 365 U.S. 646, 647 (1961); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,
424 (1957); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952).
57. See, e.g., Klapprot v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611 (1949) (prohibiting
default judgments in civil denaturalization proceedings); Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 219-25 (1946) (reversing verdict in civil action because of ex-
clusion of Wage earners from jury). See generally Note, The Supervisory Power
of the Federal Courts, supra note 55.
58. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 196 (1946).
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those interests, standing alone, require constitutional protec-
tion. Another reason for the Hepfel court's reliance on its su-
pervisory power may have been the court's recognition that
unrepresented indigent defendants are at a peculiar disadvan-
tage when they must face plaintiffs whose counsel has been
provided by the state.59 Unlike the situation in which the state
is a real party in interest and the county attorney merely a
spokesman on its behalf, the involvement of the county attor-
ney in the adjudicative stage of a paternity proceeding is on be-
half of one private litigant against another. The state's decision
to confer the benefit of counsel on indigent paternity plaintiffs
but not on indigent defendants thus suggests an equal protec-
tion issue 60 quite apart from the due process problem of the
state's bringing its full prosecutorial powers to bear against a
presumably ill-prepared defendant. While courts have gener-
ally addressed the due process issue, it seems clear that the
equal protection argument bolsters concern over the potential
unfairness of paternity hearings.
The Hepfel court also believed that the use of its supervi-
sory power was appropriate because an adjudication of pater-
nity affects interests other than those of the putative father;61 it
affects interests of the illegitimate child as well.62 Granted,
59. The California and Alaska courts found this mismatch to be particu-
larly unfair and limited their provision of appointed counsel to those cases in
which the complainant is represented by the state. See Reynolds v. Kimmons,
569 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska 1977); Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226,
230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 537, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979).
60. Since plaintiffs in paternity actions are exclusively female, and defend-
ants are exclusively male, it could be argued that the legislative decision to pro-
vide counsel for plaintiffs but not for defendants is an example of gender-based
discrimination. Gender-based discrimination is scrutinized at an intermediate
level of review, which requires more than a mere rational basis for the legisla-
tion, but falls short of strict scrutiny review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives"). See also id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). In paternity actions in
which the state is a co-plaintiff, there would be no issue of gender-based dis-
crimination since the implicit classifications would be state versus private
party. But when paternity suits are civil actions between private individuals,
and the state provides only plaintiffs with counsel, the implicit classification is
inescapably female versus male.
The Florida Supreme Court in Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Hefiler, 48 Law Week 2684 (Apr. 22, 1980), held that the equal protec-
tion guarantee of its constitution is not violated by the provision of free counsel
to mothers but not to putative fathers in paternity actions.
61. 279 N.W.2d at 346.
62. First, the child has an obvious "identity" interest in an accurate deter-
mination of paternity. See MmN. STAT. § 257.29 (1978) (requiring that name of
adjudged father be placed on illegitimate child's birth certificate). Second,
since the determination can affect the child's inheritance rights, workers' com-
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there is no reason to believe that the interests of the child
should accrue to the putative father, creating for the father a
constitutional right to counsel. That an incorrect finding of pa-
ternity might permanently bias the child's interests empha-
sizes the necessity of ensuring the accuracy of paternity
determinations. In this respect the supervisory power is a tool
not only for enhancing the procedural rights of parties to litiga-
tion in which unfairness is probable, but also for safeguarding
the interests of nonparties who are unable to gain access to the
forum in which their fate is being decided.
The Hepfel decision also illustrates the advantage of a
court's using its supervisory powers rather than straining con-
stitutional doctrine to establish new rights.63 The Hepfel court
succeeded in extending to indigent paternity defendants the
benefits of a due process right to counsel without actually find-
ing that, as a constitutional matter, the right itself exists.64
Thus, the provision of counsel in Hepfel serves as a temporary
judicial remedy to address the unfair manner in which pater-
nity proceedings are currently administered. The clear implica-
tion of the court's opinion is that its holding can be vitiated by
legislative action designed to make paternity adjudications
more fair.65 The use of the supervisory power allows courts
pensation benefits, and insurance proceeds, the Hepfel court expressed the
view that a child has a financial stake in an accurate finding of paternity. 279
N.W.2d at 346. This consideration should not be given too much weight, how-
ever, since there are obviously situations in which an inaccurate determination
is in the child's best financial interest. Third, the child's interests are affected
in that an adjudged father must consent to the child's adoption and may assert
a right to custody superior to that of any person other than the child's mother.
Id. (citing In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962)).
63. For a discussion of how some states employ their constitutions to pro-
vide protection beyond that provided by the federal constitution, see Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. Rav.
489 (1977).
64. In this respect, the Hepfel court seems to have promulgated what Pro-
fessor Henry Monaghan has called "constitutional common law." See
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1975). Professor Monaghan argues that the fed-
eral courts' use of the supervisory power in fashioning exclusionary rules is an
example of a "substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various con-
stitutional provisions." Id. at 2-3, 26-27. Another commentator has argued that
while the right to a fair hearing is shielded from political influences by judicial
interpretations of due process requirements, many of the specific components
of a fair hearing may not reach the level at which constitutional protection is
mandated. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1278-
1304 (1975). See generally Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due
Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 Hnv. L. REv. 1510
(1975).
65. The Hepfel court suggested to the legislature "that the correct adjudi-
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temporarily to fill voids left by legislative inaction when consti-
tutional rights are only indirectly implicated. Unlike a constitu-
tional ruling, however, a decision based on supervisory power
does not foreclose the legislature from eventually deciding the
same issue. Indeed, it seems apparent that the court in Hepfel
used its supervisory power specifically to spur the legislature to
action.66
The supervisory power helps courts reconcile their desire
to exercise reasoned self-restraint in constitutional interpreta-
tion with the need to correct serious flaws in the fair adminis-
tration of justice. Courts "may exert a supervisory power with
greater freedom to reflect [their] notions of good policy ...
[even when] these expressions of policy are not necessarily
embodied in the concept of due process." 67 But the supervisory
power can also be used to invigorate the political climate-to
open "'a dialogue with [the legislature] . . . in which the factor
of inertia is now on the side of individual liberty.'. . . The legis-
lature, at the least, becomes sensitive to those areas in which
its own remedial scheme is lacking and can use the court's de-
termination as a focal point for the reexamination of the policy
questions involved."68 Now that the Minnesota Supreme Court,
through its Hepfel decision, has opened the dialogue, the Min-
cation of paternity [can be] significantly furthered by providing for the availa-
bility and use of the blood-grouping tests currently available." 279 N.W.2d at
347. In 1976, both the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association and
the American Medical Association recommended the use of a series of seven
blood and genetic marker tests either to establish nonpaternity or, with the aid
of probability tables, to infer the likelihood of paternity. See Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parent-
age, 10 FAm. L.Q. 247, 257, 283 (1976). The simple ABO red cell test can exclude
10 to 20% of putative fathers. Five additional tests-Rh, MNS, Kell, Duffy, and
Kidd-increase the probability of excluding a nonfather to 63 to 72%, depend-
ing on race. If HIA tissue typing is added to this battery of tests, the
probability of exclusion rises to at least 93%. Id. at 256-57. See also Terasaki,
Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Test-
ing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 554-55 (1978). All seven of these tests are currently con-
ducted by the War Memorial Blood Bank in Minneapolis. The series of six red
blood cell tests costs about $65 per person or about $195 for a child, its mother,
and its putative father. IA testing costs about $90 per person.
In two other recent cases the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken note of
the high reliability of blood testing and has urged the legislature to provide for
such testing in paternity cases. See State ex rel. Ortloff v. Hanson, 277 N.W.2d
205, 206-07 (Minn. 1979) (court notes that federal government may soon adopt
uniform procedures relating to use of blood tests to determine paternity). See
also Wessels v. Swanson, 289 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Minn. 1979).
66. See 279 N.W.2d at 347-48; note 65 supra.
67. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1946).
68. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Monaghan,
supra note 64, at 29).
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nesota Legislature should respond by seeking a complete and
permanent solution to the unfairness that pervades paternity
proceedings. 69
69. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that the right of an indi-
gent paternity defendant to counsel, extended in Hepfel, attaches before the re-
quirement to admit or deny paternity. Ramsey County Pub. Defender's Office
v. Fleming, Finance and Commerce, p. 8, at col. 2 (Minn. Apr. 18, 1980).
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